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Summary
On June 28, 2006, the Bush Administration announced its proposal to sell 36
F-16 C/D Block 50/52 Falcon combat aircraft to Pakistan at an estimated case value
of $3 billion.  The F-16 Falcon is a single engine multi-role aircraft manufactured by
Lockheed Martin Corp.  Its relatively low cost and high versatility make the F-16 one
of the most exported fighter aircraft in the world.  The F-16 was first fielded in 1979
and has been upgraded significantly.  The capabilities of the F-16 vary greatly
depending on the upgrade or modification fielded.  The most modern F-16 flown by
the United States is the Block 50/52.  Three other F-16 related sales to Pakistan were
also proposed. 
Some believe that these sales are partly an effort to reward the Pakistani
Government for the role it has played in support of U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts,
and this consideration is noted in the text of the formal notification of the F-16 sales.
Some analysts, however, see the decision to resume F-16 sales to Pakistan as
disruptive of regional stability and efforts to resolve disputes there.
Combat aircraft are considered “essential for conducting surprise attacks or
initiating large-scale offensive operations.”  Therefore, the  transfer of combat
aircraft can be a significant policy decision, especially to a region with known
tensions and territorial disputes. Generally speaking, arguments for foreign military
sales tend to focus on advancing U.S. industry, supporting allied countries, and
promoting interoperability with those countries.  Arguments against arms sales tend
to focus on the negative aspects of military technology proliferation and the potential
for causing regional instability.  The federal government approves arms sales on a
case-by case basis.
It is currently unclear what long-term effects a potential sale of combat aircraft
to South Asia might have on U.S. political relations with Pakistan and India, or the
political relationship between them.  The reported U.S. willingness to sell F-16s or
F/A-18s to India may mitigate that country’s disappointment with any renewed U.S.
arms sales to Pakistan and neutralize any increase in Pakistan’s military capability.
Militarily, the importance of the proposed transfer of new F-16s and the upgrade of
Pakistan’s legacy F-16s can be viewed in the context of Pakistan’s conventional
military confrontation with India, its nuclear confrontation with that country, and its
struggle with terrorists and insurgents.
Much of the commentary following the June 28th announcement centered on
how a potential sale of aircraft to Pakistan, and possibly to India, would be beneficial
to industry.  The potential benefits most frequently mentioned  were extending the
production life of U.S. aircraft with limited domestic prospects and improving U.S.
industry’s position vis-a-vis other rivals in an increasingly competitive military
export market.  For broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S.
Relations, and CRS Issue Brief IB93097, India-U.S.-Relations. This report will be
updated as events warrant.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Pakistan-U.S. Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
India-U.S. Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Pakistan-India Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
U.S. Combat Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Potential Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Political Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Military Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Combat Aircraft Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
U.S. Industrial Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1 For texts of the formal notifications associated with the proposed sales of F-16 aircraft and





See, also, “Background Briefing by Administration Officials on U.S.-South Asia Relations,”
U.S. Department of State, Mar. 25, 2005; William Milam and Sarmila Bose, “The Right
Stuff,” Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 11, 2005.
2 For details regarding the procedures involved in reviewing an arms sale, see CRS Report
RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process.
Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia: 
Potential Implications
Introduction
On June 28, 2006, the Bush Administration announced its proposal to sell 36
F-16 C/D Block 50/52 Falcon combat aircraft to Pakistan at an estimated case value
of $3 billion.  Three other F-16 related sales to Pakistan were also proposed on June
28.  These sales include F16 A/B Mid-Life Update Modification Kits to upgrade
existing Pakistani F-16 aircraft bought during President Reagan’s first term; engine
modifications and structural upgrades for existing F-16s, and various missiles,
munitions and associated hardware to be utilized on the Pakistani F-16s.1 Some
believe that these sales are partly an effort to reward the Pakistani Government for
the role it has played in support of U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts, and this
consideration is noted in the text of the formal notification of the F-16 sales.
From the date (June 28, 2006) when Congress was formally notified of the
proposed F-16 sales to Pakistan, Congress has 30 calendar days within which to
review the proposed sales, and express its will in accordance with statutory
procedures set out in Section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).  Should
Congress chose to block the Pakistani sales, it must act to do so within the prescribed
30 days through the enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval.  Otherwise, the
President is authorized to proceed with the sales.2
Pakistan-U.S. Relations  
Pakistan-U.S. relations are rooted in the Cold War and South Asia regional
politics of the 1950s.  Differing expectations of the regional security relationship
have long bedeviled bilateral ties: the United States viewed Pakistan as a valuable
ally in its efforts to contain the Soviet Union; Pakistan saw the United States as a
powerful guarantor of its security vis-a-vis India.  In the mid-1970s, strains arose
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over Pakistan’s efforts to respond to India’s 1974 underground nuclear test by
seeking its own nuclear weapons capability; U.S. aid was suspended in 1979.
However, only months later, Pakistan again took the role of frontline ally, this time
in the U.S.-supported effort to push the Soviet Army out of Afghanistan, and
sanctions were waived.  Despite the renewal of U.S. aid and close security ties, many
in Congress remained troubled by Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.  In 1985,
Section 620E(e) (the Pressler amendment) was added to the Foreign Assistance Act,
requiring the President to certify to Congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear
explosive device during the fiscal year for which aid is to be provided.  With the
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s nuclear activities again came under
intensive U.S. scrutiny and, in 1990, President George H.W. Bush again suspended
aid to Pakistan.  One result of this aid cutoff was the non-delivery of 28 F-16 fighter
aircraft purchased by Pakistan in 1989 (in 1998, the United States agreed to
compensate Pakistan with a cash payment and goods, including surplus wheat).  It
was not until late-2001, when the United States again looked to Pakistan as a
frontline ally, that major U.S. aid, including major weapons systems, again flowed
to Pakistan.3
India-U.S. Relations  
The U.S.-India relationship was for decades dictated by  the politics of the Cold
War.  The Soviet collapse freed India-U.S. relations from the constraints of global
bipolarity, but during the 1990s interactions continued to be affected by the
India-Pakistan rivalry and nuclear weapons proliferation in the region. Recently,
however, bilateral relations are greatly improved, with President Bush calling India
a “natural partner” of the United States and his Administration seeking to assist
India’s rise as a major power in the new century.  Despite a concurrent U.S.
rapprochement with Pakistan, U.S.-India security cooperation has flourished and
includes regular military exercises. In June 2005, the United States and India signed
a ten-year defense framework agreement that calls for expanding bilateral
cooperation in a number of security-related areas.  Some laud increased U.S.-India
security ties as providing potential counterbalance to Chinese influence in the region,
but the emergence of an overt counterweight alliance is viewed by many as both
misguided and unlikely.4
Pakistan-India Relations  
Three full-scale wars and a constant state of military friction have marked nearly
six decades of rivalry between Pakistan and India. The acrimonious nature of the
partition of British India into two successor states in 1947 and the unresolved issue
of Kashmiri sovereignty have been major sources of tension.  Both countries have
built large defense establishments at significant cost to economic and social
development.  Nevertheless, a peace initiative begun in 2003 has improved the
relationship and led to a January 2004 summit and an agreement to re-engage in a
dialogue to bring about “peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu
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and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”  In April 2005, the two governments
released a joint statement calling their current bilateral peace process “irreversible,”
although some analysts believe the process could quickly unravel following a major
terrorist attack or some other unforeseen development.  Officials from both countries
(and the United States) offer generally positive assessments of the ongoing dialogue
even as progress on territorial disputes, especially that involving Kashmir, has been
minimal.  The Pentagon’s June 2006 notifications to Congress assert that Pakistan’s
planned purchase of new F-16s and related equipment “would not significantly
reduce India’s quantitative or qualitative military advantage” nor affect the regional
balance of power.
U.S. Combat Aircraft 
The F-16 Falcon is a single engine multi-role aircraft manufactured by
Lockheed Martin Corp.  Its relatively low cost and high versatility make the F-16 one
of the most exported fighter aircraft in the world.  The F-16 was first fielded in 1979
and has been upgraded significantly.  The capabilities of the F-16 vary greatly
depending on the upgrade or modification fielded.  The most modern F-16 flown by
the United States is the Block 50/52.  The aircraft being proposed for export to
Pakistan will incorporate high-resolution radars capable of all-weather precision
targeting and air-to-air combat at extended ranges.  A helmet-mounted cuing system
will improve the aircraft’s “dogfighting” capability as well as air-to-ground lethality.
Integrated defensive electronic countermeasures will reduce the aircraft’s
vulnerability to enemy aircraft and air defenses, and conformal fuel tanks will
increase the F-16’s range without reducing the number of weapons carried. 
The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is a dual engine, multi-role aircraft manufactured
by the Boeing Company.  It is the U.S. Navy’s most modern and capable combat
aircraft.  The Super Hornet reached initial operational capability in 2001. The
differences between the E/F and earlier F/A-18 variants (A/B, C/D) are so great, that
many consider it to be a new aircraft rather than an upgrade of an existing model.
The Super Hornet has been approved for export, but no sales have yet been made.
The F/A-18C/D models, which are no longer in production,  have been exported to
eight countries.
Potential Implications
Political Implications  
It is currently unclear what long-term effects a potential sale of combat aircraft
to South Asia might have on U.S. political relations with Pakistan and India, or the
political relationship between them.  The Bush Administration’s decision to resume
F-16 sales to Pakistan after a 16-year hiatus was first announced at a March 2005
press conference by unnamed senior State Department officials.  At that conference,
the Administration unveiled a “new strategy” for South Asia that includes an
intention to help India “become a major world power in the 21st century.”
Administration officials also said the United States welcomes India’s interest in the
possible purchase of F-16 or F/A-18 warplanes and is ready to discuss the sale of
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“transformative systems in areas such as command and control, early warning, and
missile defense.”5  Two days before the State Department’s March 2005 statements,
twenty Members of the House wrote to President Bush urging him to not license the
sale of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan as such a sale would “undermine our long-term
strategic interests in South Asia” and “squander an opportunity” to continue building
positive relations with India.6  Meanwhile, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
expressed “great disappointment” at the U.S. decision, saying the move “could have
negative consequences for India’s security environment,” but he later softened his
criticism and welcomed an apparent U.S. willingness to expand cooperation with
India.  Fifteen months later, when the Bush Administration formally notified
Congress of a potential sale of F-16s to Pakistan, an Indian External Affairs Ministry
statement said the step “is not conducive to improving ties between India and
Pakistan.”7
Justifications for the decision to resume F-16 sales include a U.S. interest that
Pakistan “feel secure” and a perception that a substantive U.S. defense relationship
with both Pakistan and India will stabilize “the balance” between them.  In June
2006, the White House said the planned F-16 sale “demonstrates our commitment to
a long-term relationship with Pakistan.”8  Some believe the decision is a reward to
President Gen. Musharraf and the Pakistani military for their post-9/11 cooperation
with U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts, and see renewed exports as potentially
increasing U.S. leverage in Islamabad while eroding anti-American sentiments there.
Such leverage could include increased Pakistani cooperation in the areas of
counterterrorism and nonproliferation.9  It may be that the timing of the June 2006
notification was influenced by developments in U.S.-India relations.  Washington and
New Delhi are moving forward with a landmark civil nuclear cooperation initiative.
Islamabad claims the initiative will cause a power imbalance in the region and it
repeatedly has requested a similar arrangement with Washington.  The Bush
Administration rejects such requests and also has not moved to provide Pakistan with
a defense cooperation pact similar to that made with India in 2005.10
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Some analysts see the decision to resume F-16 sales to Pakistan as disruptive
of regional stability and efforts to resolve disputes there.  This concern was
articulated by India’s external affairs minister in April 2005:  “[M]ilitary assistance,
particularly when unrelated to counterterrorism efforts, conveys a political signal
both within Pakistan and vis-a-vis India-Pakistan relations. ... It consequently has
repercussions for our dialogue that is currently at a sensitive stage.”11  Some in
Congress voice similarly grounded opposition in more explicit terms:  At a June 2005
House hearing on U.S. South Asia policy, one lawmaker said, “F-16s is how you
fight India.  It’s not how you fight terrorists.  This is outrageous.”  The sentiment was
echoed by several other Members in attendance.  However, two nongovernmental
experts appearing before the House panel approved of such sales as important
symbolic gestures that would likely result in much-needed improvement in U.S.-
Pakistan relations.12
Several critics have contended that renewed F-16 sales may strengthen
nondemocratic forces in Islamabad.  Though the Bush Administration has made
spreading democracy a cornerstone of its foreign policy, Pakistan continues to be
governed by an army general who came to power through a military coup, and the
State Department has noted that Pakistan’s democratic institutions remain weak.13
In H.Rept. 109-486 (June 2006), the House Appropriations Committee expressed
concern about Pakistan’s “lack of progress on improving democratic governance and
rule of law.”  Furthermore, some Pakistani commentators wonder why Islamabad
plans to spend billions of dollars on weapons of allegedly questionable utility while
the country’s social services and infrastructure are in dire need of improvements.14
This perspective gained additional traction in the wake of Pakistan’s catastrophic
October 2005 earthquake, when Islamabad chose to postpone and eventually scale
down the number of F-16s it would seek to purchase.
As noted above, congressional concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation
activities are longstanding.  Some opponents of resumed F-16 sales argue that the
United States should not provide sophisticated weapons to a country that has been
a source of significant horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation. Legislation
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introduced which reflects this concern in the 109th Congress includes H.R. 1553 and
S. 12 (Sec.  232),  which  prohibit aid or military equipment to Pakistan unless the
President certifies that Pakistan is cooperating with U.S. nuclear non-proliferation
efforts.  In 2004, Pakistani metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan, known as the founder
of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and a national hero, confessed to
involvement in an illicit nuclear smuggling network that sold crucial nuclear
weapons technology and uranium-enrichment materials to North Korea, Libya, and
Iran.  To date, Pakistan refuses to allow any direct access to Khan by non-Pakistani
investigators and, in May 2006, the Islamabad government declared the Khan
investigation “closed.”  Some in Congress remain skeptical, however, and a House
panel subsequently held a hearing to further discuss the issue.  At that hearing, non-
governmental experts urged that U.S. and international investigators be given direct
access to Khan, in particular to learn more about assistance given to Iran’s
controversial nuclear program.15
Military Implications 
The importance of the proposed transfer of new F-16s and the upgrade of
Pakistan’s legacy F-16s can be viewed in the context of Pakistan’s conventional
military confrontation with India, its nuclear confrontation with that country, and its
struggle with terrorists and insurgents.
India dominated the air when it last clashed with Pakistan in 1971. According
to some accounts, Pakistani air strikes were largely ineffective, and air support of
ground forces was “non-existent.”16 India currently enjoys a significant quantitative
advantage over Pakistan’s air force. It has 21 more fighter squadrons than Pakistan
and a larger number (124) of modern aircraft.  India operates an aircraft carrier with
short-take off and vertical landing fighters.  In terms of quality, the F-16 Block 50/52
aircraft appears to be roughly equivalent to India’s most advanced combat aircraft,
the Russian-made Su-30.17
Unlike Pakistan, however, India supports its combat aircraft with aerial
refueling, electronic countermeasures, and modern airborne warning and control
aircraft.18  The sale of 36 F-16s to Pakistan and the upgrade of existing F-16s would
increase that country’s number of modern combat aircraft but would still not bring
it close to parity with India.  If India were to add F-16s or F/A-18s to its inventory,
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the disparity in aviation capabilities between the two countries would grow even
more. 
Some express concern that Pakistan could use its new F-16s to deliver nuclear
weapons.  The overall potential impact on nuclear deterrence and stability in South
Asia of additional Pakistani F-16s, however, appears unclear.  First, because the 32
F-16s that Pakistan already fields are believed to be nuclear capable, additional F-16s
don’t appear to introduce new capabilities but may expand existing ones.  Second,
Pakistan also fields nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.  Some believe that ballistic
missiles add instability to the security equation because they are high priority targets,
and consequently the pressure to use them early in a conflict can be great.19 Thus, if
additional nuclear-capable F-16s were to replace existing nuclear-capable ballistic
missiles in Pakistan’s arsenal, some may argue that additional F-16s could reduce
nuclear instability.
Some suggest that Pakistan could use F-16s against terrorists and insurgents.
It appears that F-16s could be used in such operations, but they could also be
considered “over-designed” for these tasks.  The Block 50/52 variant that is being
proposed for export is the most advanced version of the F-16 flown by U.S. military
forces.  It incorporates advanced weapons and avionics for air-to-air combat that
appear unnecessary for counterinsurgency operations. Less expensive and less
sophisticated  aircraft such as attack helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, and
combat search and rescue aircraft would appear to have greater utility in combating
insurgents and other non-state actors than supersonic fighter aircraft.20  According to
the Indian Defense Minister, “The F-16 and other lethal weapons are not required for
fighting terrorism and are used in full-fledged wars.  Given Pakistan’s track record,
we fear that such weapons will be directed toward India.”21 
Combat Aircraft Proliferation  
Combat aircraft are considered “essential for conducting surprise attacks or
initiating large-scale offensive operations.”22  Therefore, the  transfer of combat
aircraft can be a significant policy decision, especially to a region with known
tensions and territorial disputes. 
The sale of F-16 Block 50/52 aircraft to Pakistan, will upgrade its inventory of
this fighter, but may not completely fulfill its perceived need for a highly advanced,
current generation, combat fighter.   While financing the purchase of two different
fighter aircraft could be problematic for Pakistan, some in Pakistan are reportedly
concerned about the potential for future military sales cutoffs by the U.S. given the
history of difficulties Pakistan has had with the United States over proliferation
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issues.  They argue against limiting future aircraft procurement to the United States.
Further, the proposed sale of F-16s appears to offer no opportunities for off-sets or
co-production which limits the long-term benefit to Pakistan’s aerospace industry.
Consequently, Pakistan continues a relationship with China, including testing of
China’s advanced J-10 fighter, and co-development with China of the JF-17 fighter.
Pakistan has been negotiating a possible purchase of the Swedish JAS Gripen multi-
role fighter.  Should the United States sell the F-16 to Pakistan,  Sweden would
reportedly offer to sell the Gripen. Thus, it seems unlikely that the United States will
become Pakistan’s principal supplier of advanced combat aircraft.23 
The reported U.S. willingness to sell F-16s or F/A-18s to India may mitigate that
country’s disappointment with any renewed U.S. arms sales to Pakistan and
neutralize any increase in Pakistan’s military capability. India may also use the
prospect of the purchase of U.S. fighters as leverage in negotiations with its primary
military supplier, Russia, to obtain more sophisticated systems, better financing, or
additional licensed production options for its domestic defense industry.  Should
India choose to purchase U.S. fighters, it may seek not just the aircraft and support
services, but some form of co-production or co-assembly options — a prospect that
would raise policy questions for the United States regarding the release of military
technology, and how such information might be used by India.  This is particularly
important given India’s ambitions to develop a significant aerospace production
capability and its past and present aerospace acquisitions from Russia, France, the
United Kingdom, and Israel.24
U.S. Industrial Base 
Much of the commentary following the June 28th announcement centered on
how a potential sale of aircraft to Pakistan, and possibly to India, would be beneficial
to industry.  The potential benefits most frequently mentioned  were extending the
production life of U.S. aircraft with limited domestic prospects and improving U.S.
industry’s position vis-a-vis other rivals in an increasingly competitive military
export market. After decades of successful production, the F-16 production line
appears to be approaching its end.  As currently projected, the F-16 production line
— which employs approximately 5,000 workers — could close in 2008.  A sale of
36 or more F-16s to Pakistan could keep the line open for another year.25
The larger prize, however, is a potential sale to India and the consequent
opening of a market long-closed to U.S. industry.  India is seeking a larger number
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of combat aircraft than Pakistan — 126 — and has a much larger inventory of
combat aircraft, approximately 700, that it will eventually need to replace. U.S.
companies are contending with competitively priced Russian and European aircraft
for a share of the global military aircraft market.  Penetrating the Indian market, and
beating European competitors, could, many believe, help U.S. companies compete
in other aircraft export markets.  Also, it is argued that aircraft sales to India could
prove a “tip of the iceberg” for all types of military exports to that country.  India has
embarked on a long-term plan to upgrade its armaments and strengthen its military,
and some say that “high on its list are early warning and missile defense systems,
nuclear fuel and technologies and space-related technologies.”26
Questions remain about the potential domestic U.S. benefit from these
prospective sales.  While preserving U.S. jobs appears clearly beneficial, the number
of jobs preserved and the value of those jobs remains unclear.  India would likely
demand that the majority of aircraft be produced in India.  This would increase jobs
in India and reduce jobs in the United States.  Also, some say not all jobs are equal
in terms of their benefit to the U.S.  industrial base.  Producing for India and Pakistan
the exact same aircraft that is currently being produced in the United States would
preserve assembly line-type jobs.  Many argue this would do little to advance
innovation or make U.S. industry more competitive.  Only if the exported aircraft
require noteworthy design and engineering changes, they say, would these skills be
developed to benefit the of industrial base.
